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Stepping in for the Polluters?
Climate Justice under Partial Compliance∗
Abstract: Not all countries do their fair share in the eﬀort of preventing dangerous
climate change. This presents those who are willing to do their part with the question
whether they should `take up the slack' and try to compensate for the non-compliers'
failure to reduce emissions. There is a pro tanto reason for doing so given the human
rights violations associated with dangerous climate change. The article focuses on
fending oﬀ two objections against a duty to take up the slack: that it is unfair and
ineﬀective. We grant that it is unfair if some have to step in for others but argue that
this does not amount to a decisive objection under conditions of partial compliance.
With regard to the charge of emission reductions being ineﬀective, we argue that the
empirical case for this claim is missing and that even if it were not, there still remains
the option of taking up the slack in other forms.
1. Introduction
Climate change is the epitome of a challenge for collective action. The eﬀect
of greenhouse gases on the climate depends in no way on where on the planet
they are emitted. Therefore, if dangerous climate change is to be prevented,
everybody's eﬀorts to limit emissions matter. As is to be expected, however,
not everybody contributes to those eﬀorts. And neither is it easy to enact an
agreementnot to speak of a monitored agreement, coupled with sanctionsto
make everybody contribute. The global nature of the problem and the economic
costs of emission reduction measures hamper all attempts for reaching an ef-
fective treaty. Climate policy therefore presents itself as an ideal test case for
non-ideal theory dealing with partial compliance: First, there is a tremendously
serious harm to be prevented, second, this harm ought to be prevented jointly,
third, many important agents are not complying (in the sense that they do less
than their fair share in the joint eﬀort), and last, it would be possible for the
compliers to act in place of the non-compliers in order to prevent the tremen-
∗ We want to thank Christian Baatz, Carina Fourie, Anton Leist, Aaron Maltais, Fabian
Schuppert, Christian Seidel, Ivo Wallimann, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.
We also gratefully acknowledge the ﬁnancial support of the URPP Ethics of the University of
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dously serious harm.1 Many agents are aware of this situation and give the
compliance levels of others large weight in their deliberations. George W. Bush
famously claimed: I'll tell you one thing I'm not going to do is I'm not going
to let the United States carry the burden for cleaning up the world's air, like
the Kyoto treaty would have done. China and India were exempted from that
treaty. I think we need to be more even-handed. (Singer 2002, 26) Similarly, the
EU explicitly made its quantitative reduction goal dependent on the compliance
levels of others (minus 20% by 2020 if others do not act, minus 30% if they do).2
China's lead negotiator for Copenhagen referred to Western two-car households
and said: Many Chinese households have only just purchased their ﬁrst car
and they tell us we should ride bikes?3 These quotes can all be interpreted as
expressing the underlying principle that if other states do less than they ought
to do, we may do less, too. From a moral point of view, however, there are
two further possible principles: First, if other states do less than they ought to
do, we should do our fair share anyway. That is: We should do our fair share
independently of what others do. Second, if others do not complyi.e. if they
emit greenhouse gases above their fair sharethen we have the duty to reduce
our emissions below our fair share. It is the aim of this article to discuss this
last principle, i.e. whether the non-compliance of others in reducing emissions
creates a duty for additional emission reductions on our part. In other words:
Is there a duty to take up the slack?4
In the background of this article there is a rough idea of what kind of climate
policy would ideally be required. We believe that climate change is a problem
for intergenerational distributive justice but for the sake of the argument, we
rely here only on the claim that climate change has the realistic potential to
leave the human rights of future persons unprotected. As some have argued
(for example Caney 2009a; Bell 2011), climate change jeopardizes such human
rights as the right to life, to health, and to subsistence. In this paper, we use
the term `dangerous climate change' as a shorthand for `climate change that has
an unacceptably large potential for human rights violations'. Given the time
lag of several decades between emissions and their full eﬀect on the climate, the
duty to prevent the climate change related violation of these human rights in
the future falls on the present generation. Thus there is a problem of justice
between present and future generations. But given this intergenerational task
1 More precisely, this is possible at least in principle and at least to a large degree. In many
instances (for example if large players like the US and China are among the non-compliers) it
is not possible to take up the non-compliers' share simply by means of reducing one's emissions
to zero. Rather, one would have to aim at negative emissions by building up sinks or by taking
on emission reductions in other countries.
2 http://ec.europa.eu/research/energy/eu/policy/energy-and-climate-policy/index_en.
htm (retrieved June 21, 2011).
3 http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/09/02/china-sustains-blunt-you-ﬁrst-message-
on-co2/ (retrieved June 21, 2011).
4 Note that many of the considerations that are adduced in this article also bear on the
question what relevance the compliance level of other non-compliers has for determining the
strength of the duty of non-compliers to do more than they currently do (rather than bearing
only on the question what relevance the compliance level of non-compliers has for the duty of
the compliers to take up the slack).
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of protecting human rights, there is also an issue of justice within the present
generation. This problem is the just distribution of the emission reduction bur-
dens that are necessary to protect the human rights of future generations.5 On
many diﬀerent principlesand on any of the plausible onesit is primarily peo-
ple in developed nations who have to take the lead in reducing emissions (see
for example Caney 2009b; 2010; Meyer/Roser 2010; Singer 2002). We assume
for the purpose of this article that countries can be ascribed fair shares in terms
of emission reduction obligations or, stated diﬀerently, fair shares in terms of
an emission budget. On the simplest possible view, the equal per capita view,
this amounts to ascribing each country an emission budget proportional to its
population, for example one ton of emissions per person and year.6 The question
of this article can then be stated as follows: If other states emit more than their
fair share of one ton per person, do we have the duty to reduce our emissions
below one ton per person? (A further possibility, to be hinted at later on, is for
there to be a duty to take up the slack in the form of other burdens than in the
form of additional emission reductions. Such other burdens might for example
consist in ﬁnancing adaptation to climate change or in shouldering the eﬀorts to
reach a collective agreement). The question is not about states failing to comply
with legally codiﬁed (fair or unfair) shares but rather about failing to comply
with morality's demands in the sense of either doing less than one's fair share
in the absence of a treaty or in the sense of enacting a treaty with less than fair
shares. In discussing this question, we will use the following terminology: The
states that do not exceed their fair share of emissions are `compliers' (whether
or not they are willing to take up the slack), while the states that exceed their
fair share of emissions are `non-compliers'. The states that lower their level be-
low their fair share of emissions are called `slack takers'. Given that political
discussions on climate change are often framed in terms of the compliance and
non-compliance of states, our argumentation focuses on this type of agent rather
than on individuals. This does not mean that other agents, such as individual
persons or corporations, do not have any duties with regard to preventing dan-
gerous climate change. Many of the considerations we adduce could be applied
5 Note that by structuring the climate justice problem as two separate problems (intergen-
erational and intragenerational justice), we assume that the group of the non-compliers (as
a subset of the present generation) does not overlap with the group of the victims of non-
compliance (as a subset of future generations). This is a simpliﬁcation as present emissions
also cause some limited harm in the near future (note, however, that the intergenerational
aspect of climate change is not the only factor responsible for the limited overlap between
non-compliers and the victims of non-compliance; it is also important that on average people
in the developed world emit more while people in the developing world are more vulnerable to
climate change). If we assumed that the non-compliers were themselves the victims of their
non-compliance, we would be faced with a problem of a diﬀerent nature.
6 Note that this does not answer the question how countries should distribute the burdens
of emission reductions internally.
Many (including one of the co-authors, see Meyer/Roser 2010) have argued that the equal per
capita view leaves out important considerations and have proposed alternative schemes of fair
burden-sharing. Note that under such alternatives, the same questions about the duty to take
up the slack pose themselves as under the equal per capita view. For a comprehensive critique
of emissions egalitarianism that goes beyond other critiques in that it not only questions equal
shares but the very idea of fair shares of emissions, see Caney 2009b.
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to individuals as well, although a number of aspects might play out slightly dif-
ferently (such as the eﬀects an agent's reductions have on other agents' eﬀorts
or the justiﬁcation for investing one's eﬀort into convincing others of a political
solution rather than into personal mitigation measures).
2. Setting the Stage
Before we discuss objections to the duty to take up the slack, we have to address
the concern that such a duty might be a non-starter to begin with and that it
is therefore not even necessary to discuss any substantial objections to it. Such
a judgement can be based on the thought that once the correct principle for a
just distribution of emission rights has been identiﬁed, it would be a conceptual
mistake to ask further questions about what each agent is morally required to
do. What each agent is morally required to do is exactly what we determined
when we determined a just distribution of emission rights. The countries that
do not exceed their fair share of emissions could claim that they have already
lived up to what we determined to be their responsibility and that, therefore,
there cannot be any question about further responsibilities. It is only the non-
compliers, they can claim, that are still answerable for failing to live up to their
responsibility.
The reason why some are tempted to think that the question whether there
is a duty to take up the slack cannot even arise lies in the fact that each agent's
fair share must be determined under the assumption of full compliance. When
one speaks of a fair share, one refers implicitly to a completely fair share, i.e. a
fair share as determined under the assumption of full compliance. It is tempting
to think that since what each agent is responsible for under full compliance is
precisely his or her fair share, this should be the case under partial compliance
as well (see Murphy 2000, 89). J. L. Cohen seems to be reasoning along these
lines when he says: Burdens, like beneﬁts, ought to be fairly distributed, and
ceteris paribus no-one is morally required to take on more than his fair share of
a burden because someone else defects [. . . ]. (Cohen 1981, 76) Similarly, David
Miller (2011, 238239) states: The key argument here is that because the col-
lective responsibility to avert injustice has been fairly distributed, ex hypothesi,
by doing my fair share I have discharged my obligation, and the injustice that re-
mains, because of partial compliance, is the responsibility of the non-compliers,
and only theirs. But there is an important diﬀerence between the full compli-
ance and the partial compliance condition. Under full compliance, each agent
knows that if he does not exceed his fair share of emissions, dangerous climate
change will be prevented. Each agent's responsibility is then determined by
what his fair share is, since reaching the goal in question is secured if everyone
contributes his or her fair share. In situations of partial compliance, in contrast,
each complier knows that if all compliers only do their fair share, the goal of
preventing dangerous climate change will not be reached. Had everyone done
their fair share, we would not face the prospect of unacceptable human rights
infringements, but given the fact of partial compliance, we now do. Even if
Stepping in for the Polluters? 481
dangerous climate change cannot be avoided anymore, given the level of non-
compliance, it is still possible to at least reduce the degree of dangerous climate
change and thus prevent further human rights infringements. For this reason, it
becomes questionable whether the compliers' responsibility is to be determined
exclusively by what their fair share would bein other words, the principle that
distributes emission rights fairly is not the only moral principle to be considered.
Since fair shares in emission reductions were attributed in order to reach the goal
of protecting human rights, it would be strange not to consider the fact whether
human rights can be protected important for the speciﬁcation of our moral du-
ties under conditions of partial compliance. While it is convincing to take full
compliance as the appropriate background condition for determining fair shares,
it is not clear why we should take full compliance as the condition under which
our responsibility or duty all things considered is to be determined. It has to be
established by argument that fair shares are the sole factor to determine what
our duty all things considered is (see below, the fairness objection).
Given that we have set aside a fundamental objection to even raising the
question of a duty to take up the slack, we now want to sketch a basic consider-
ation that speaks for a duty to take up the slack: If other states do not comply,
i.e. if they emit above their fair share, then there is an unacceptably large po-
tential of human rights violations. We as a complying state can increase the
protection of these human rights by reducing our own emissions below our fair
share. Assuming that the protection of human rights is a high moral priority,
there is at least a pro tanto reason to take up the slack of the non-compliers.
We simply take this pro tanto reason as a starting point and focus the article
on fending oﬀ two objections to taking up the slack that are likely to arise in
discussions about emission reductions. The ﬁrst is that a duty to take up the
slack would unfairly burden the compliers (the `fairness objection'). The second
is that taking up the slack might do nothing to eﬀectively protect human rights
(the `eﬀectiveness objection').7 We are going to show that these objections in
their various forms fail in the context of climate justice. If these prominent
objections do not succeedas we attempt to showthe case for the existence
of a duty to take up the slack in the context of climate justice is signiﬁcantly
strengthened.
3. The Fairness Objection
The fairness objection is probably the most important objection against the duty
to take up the slack. This objection was raised by Liam Murphy (2000, esp. 88
7 Traditionally, the debate about the duty to take up the slack concerns duties of beneﬁ-
cence, and more speciﬁcally, duties to aid those in need (Cohen 1981; Murphy 2000; Horton
2004). The most prominently discussed objection has been the fairness objection, which plays
an important role in Murphy 2000. David Miller 2011 has expanded the discussion on the
duty to take up the slack to contexts where preventing harm that is done by a collective is
at stake. In a response to Miller, Stemplowska 2011 has further developed the typology of
objections to the duty to take up the slack. Our article is indebted to her structuring of the
various objections.
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93), and has also been defended by David Miller (2011).8 Whether the goal
in question is abolishing world poverty, securing refugees' rights, or preventing
dangerous climate change, the unfairness of having to take up more than one's
fair share in order for these goals to be reachedsimply because others have
refused to do their partweighs heavily. There certainly is not much to be said
against the intuition that it is unfair if some states have to cut their emissions
below their fair share just because other states refuse to reduce their emissions as
much as they should. The crucial question is whether this unfairness decisively
speaks against a duty to take up the slack. In this section we argue for a negative
answer.
In order to tackle this question, it is necessary to say more about the unfair-
ness that is involved in taking up the slack. We must ﬁrst distinguish concerns
about unfairness from concerns about overdemandingness: One concern with
the duty to take up the slack is that it might burden the slack takers with very
high costs. Taking up the slack could indeed involve very high costs, particu-
larly if only few states are willing to contribute toward taking up the slack. If
what seems objectionable about the duty to take up the slack is the high abso-
lute cost of doing one's fair share plus taking up the slack, then the problem is
overdemandingness rather than unfairness. For the existence of a duty to take
up the slack to have any practical relevance, the assumption must be made that
doing more than one's fair share is not always overly demanding for potential
slack takers. If even doing one's fair share already leaves some agents at the
edge of overdemandingness, then they might have no further moral duties under
partial compliance for that reason. We assume here that there are at least some
compliers for whom doing more than their fair share of emission reduction is
not overly demanding. How much of the slack can be taken up without running
into demandingness problems depends both on the amount of slacking caused
by non-compliersif big emitters are among the non-compliers there is more to
compensate forand on the number and size of compliers willing to take up the
slack. Even if it turns out that it is not possible for those countries that are will-
ing to take up the slack to fully compensate for the failure of the non-compliers,
there surely are some states (for example, Switzerland) that can take up at least
part of the slack without crossing the boundary of overdemandingness.
While it is intuitively compelling that having to take up the slack is unfair,
it is not transparent what exactly makes it so. There is more than one way of
describing the unfairness in play. We think that the construal of unfairness that
dominates in the real-world discussion about emission reductions (the unfairness
that state representatives have in mind when they ask for more even-handedness
in emission reductions) is in fact not the construal that can serve as the basis
of the strongest version of the fairness objection. On the construal of unfairness
these politicians seem to have in mind, what is unfair is the relative disadvantage
8 David Miller's 2011 position is that there can be a humanitarian duty to take up the slack,
but not a duty of justice. The diﬀerence between duties of justice and humanitarian duties is
that while the former can in principle be enforced, the latter cannot. Miller makes a threefold
distinction between duties of justice, humanitarian duties, and supererogatory actions. In
this article, we only distinguish between actions that are morally required and supererogatory
actions.
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that the compliers would incur as a result of taking up the slack. Let's call this
the relative disadvantage interpretation of the fairness objection. The guiding
idea of the fairness objection, according to this interpretation, is to preserve
equity within the group of states that, together, must reach the goal of avoiding
dangerous climate change. The relative disadvantage interpretation makes sense
from a strategic perspective: States are concerned with securing an advantageous
position relative to other states, especially in economic and military terms. Tak-
ing up the slack stands in tension with the goal of securing an advantageous
position, even more so since the compliers' relative disadvantage due to slack
taking is not limited to the costs that are directly associated with taking up the
slack: Eﬀorts to reduce emissions in order to compensate for other states' failure
to do so might indirectly lead to further economic or military disadvantage.
There is something problematic about the relative disadvantage interpreta-
tion of the unfairness involved in taking up the slack. If the fairness objection
is based on relative disadvantage, it is not only an objection to slack taking, it
also provides a reason against even contributing one's fair share whenever one
believes the other states to be non-compliers (Miller 2011). Those who con-
tribute their fair share are already at a relative disadvantage even if they decide
not to take up the slack, since they still bear the cost of doing their fair share,
while the non-compliers do not. The quotations from state representatives at
the beginning of this article seem to endorse the relative disadvantage interpre-
tation of the fairness objection, including acceptance of the consequence that
doing less than one's original fair share is allowed if one would otherwise be at a
relative disadvantage: State representatives often seem to think that states can
justiﬁably do less than their full compliance share as soon as other states do not
comply. However, this position is hard to defend from a moral perspective: If an
agent stands under a duty to protect human rights, and if this requires that he
contribute his fair share towards emission reductions, then it seems he must still
perform that duty even if he incurs a relative disadvantage as a result. In other
words, relative disadvantage alone cannot defeat one's duty to protect human
rights.9
If one wants to defend the more plausible position that each state is required
to do its fair share, but not more, the unfairness involved in taking up the slack
cannot be based only on the compliers' relative disadvantage. And indeed, in
the philosophical literature, a diﬀerent understanding of unfairness dominates.
On the construal which is present in the literature, the unfairness is due to the
combination of two factors (Horton 2004, 167; Miller 2011): First, if there is a
duty to take up the slack, the compliers are required do something that would
not have been their responsibility under full compliance conditions. They are
asked to do something that is someone else's job. Second, taking up the slack
is costly: It negatively aﬀects the interests of the slack takers. Both factors
need to be present: The fact that performing a duty is costly as such would not
speak against the duty, and if taking up the slack did not aﬀect the slack takers'
interests negatively at all, the fact that the duty asks them to do something
9 See Miller 2011, 238, for a more detailed discussion of why doing less than one's fair share
is not allowed in a situation in which the protection of human rights is at stake.
484 Sabine Hohl/Dominic Roser
that would not have been their responsibility under full compliance conditions
would not seem to matter. The strength of the fairness objection may vary in
relation to the costs of taking up the slack (Horton 2004; 2011). Call this the
extra burden interpretation of the unfairness involved in taking up the slack.
Note that on this construal of the unfairness involved in taking up the slack, the
relative position of the compliers compared to the position of the non-compliers
does not necessarily play any role. The objection is simply that the duty to take
up the slack unfairly burdens the compliers with extra costs that they would not
have had to bear if everyone had fulﬁlled their responsibility. According to this
view, taking up the slack would even be considered unfair if the slack taker were
still in a relatively advantageous position after having taken up the slack. This
allows one to say that taking up the slack is not only unfair if a relatively poor
country is the slack taker, but also if a rich country has to take up the slack of
other countries.
With this second and more plausible interpretation of the unfairness at hand,
we can now assess the objection. As granted earlier, there is not much to be said
against the claim that having to take up the slack is unfair. But under non-ideal
conditions, this unfairness does not straightforwardly entail that compliers are
not morally required to take up the slack. In situations of non-compliance, one
is confronted with a diﬃcult trade-oﬀ between diﬀerent kinds of `moral loss'. In
our case, either human rights that could be protected by the compliers will very
likely be infringed, or the compliers who are willing to take up the slack will be
unfairly burdened. The natural thought is that we should weigh the importance
of the protection of human rights against the importance of the preservation of
fairness. Under partial compliance conditions, a certain degree of unfairness may
be acceptable if it is necessary to reach a goal of high moral importance. The
basic argument for the duty to take up the slack is this: If the compliers do not
step in for the non-compliers, human rights will be infringed, and this weighs
more heavily than the unfairness of having to take up the slack.10 In order for
the duty to take up the slack to be invalidated, the preservation of fairness within
the group of states would have to have lexical priority over reaching the goal of
protecting human rights that would otherwise not be protected, and this seems
implausible (Stemplowska 2011). Once one allows the distributive unfairness
that occurs as a result of the duty to take up the slack to be weighed against
the human rights that could be protected by such a duty, it is hard to see why
fairness considerations should always prevail. Of course, this basic argument can
be accepted without denying that fairness considerations continue to play some
role under partial compliance. The distribution of burdens among those willing
to take up the slack even raises a new question of distributive fairness.
A counter-objection may be raised at this point. It may be argued that the
unfairness of taking up the slack and the bad consequences of dangerous climate
10 For a similar argument in response to Murphy, see Streumer 2004 and Philips 2008.
Stemplowska 2011 makes the same point with regard to the duty to help people in dire need.
Caney 2005, 772, also argues that the unfairness of asking the compliers to take up the slack
weighs less heavily than disregarding the interests of those who would suﬀer from dangerous
climate change (albeit under the assumption that those who would have to take up the slack
would be privileged agents).
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change, which consist of human rights infringements, cannot simply be weighed
against each other in this fashion. The intuition behind this possible objection
is that this trade-oﬀ fails to take seriously the special importance of fairness
considerations. It might be said that the idea of weighing itself assumes an
outlook that is unduly consequence-oriented.
We now discuss two arguments one might present for the position that taking
up the slack is not morally required, while doing one's fair share is, along with
considerations that speak against them. Both arguments make use of the dis-
tinction between doing and allowing and establish a connection between fairness
considerations and this distinction.
First, LiamMurphy (2000)anticipating the objection that the costs that are
imposed on the victims of non-compliance weigh more heavily than the unfairness
of taking up the slackdistinguishes between unfairness prescribed by moral
principles and the bad eﬀects that occur as a result of non-compliance with
moral principles. He argues that moral principles should not prescribe unfairness,
but that they cannot do anything about the bad results of non-compliance. The
latter is simply not the `fault' of the principle, since no moral principle can control
whether people will adhere to it or not (Murphy 2000, 79, 92, 152, endnote 19).
Murphy presents this argument in the context of his discussion of the duty of
beneﬁcence,11 but it can be applied to our context as well: A principle that
asks us to take up the slack prescribes unfairness, while the dangerous climate
change that occurs if we do not take up the slack is the result of non-compliance.
Consequently, if we accept Murphy's point, we should reject the duty to take
up the slack. But Murphy's argument is unconvincing. Moral principles cannot
simply abstain from taking into consideration the bad results that obtain in case
of non-compliance. If a moral principle does not prescribe a duty to take up
the slack in partial compliance situations, then that same moral principle in fact
tacitly accepts the moral costs associated with non-compliance. Since the moral
principle could make its demands sensitive to whether there is full compliance
or not and demand that the slack be taken up in case of non-compliance, it is
in some sense the `fault' of the principle if it does not do so. Of course moral
principles cannot control whether they are complied with or not, but what they
can do is prescribe actions that compensate for the eﬀects of non-compliance. It
is unclear why a moral principle should be `accountable' for what it prescribes,
but not for what it allows.
There is a second way to argue for the position that each agent's duty is
limited to doing his fair share. This second argument relies on the distinction
between negative and positive duties, and uses fair shares as the criterion to
11 Murphy makes this point with regard to his principle of collective beneﬁcence and stresses
the fact that what is owed to the victims of non-compliance is owed to them for reasons of
beneﬁcence, not for reasons of fairness (2000, 92). Because of this, he argues, the compliers are
not treating the victims unfairly by not taking up the slack, while requiring the compliers to
take up the slack is to treat them unfairly. But even if one grants that, in the context of the
duty of beneﬁcence, the compliers' failure to take up the slack is not unfair, one can still say
that it is a failure to beneﬁt others as much as one should, and securing the well-being of the
victims of non-compliance may weigh more heavily than avoiding the unfairness of the duty
to take up the slack.
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distinguish between the two. So far we have spoken about the duty to prevent
dangerous climate change from happening, but it might be important to dis-
tinguish between the negative duty not to actively contribute to human rights
infringements and the positive duty to prevent human rights infringements from
being brought about by other agents (or by external factors). The thought is
that fair shares can serve as a criterion to distinguish between the negative duty
not to actively contribute to dangerous climate change and the positive duty
to prevent dangerous climate change from happening, so that the duty not to
exceed one's fair share of emissions would be considered a negative duty, while
the duty to take up the slack would be considered a positive duty. The rea-
soning behind this would be as follows: No (or hardly any) state's emissions of
greenhouse gases are suﬃcient to cause dangerous climate change by themselves,
so that no state straightforwardly brings about dangerous climate change. The
most we can say of an individual country is that it is actively contributing to
dangerous climate change. But what is the criterion that determines the level
of emissions at which a state is to be considered an active contributor? In a
causal sense, every state is contributing to dangerous climate change, but this
is not what matters from the moral perspective: We should not think of states
with very low emission levels as active contributors to dangerous climate change.
Instead, we should determine each state's maximum level of emissions that does
not count as active contribution to dangerous climate change with reference to
what that same state's fair share of emission rights would be.
This could be justiﬁed in the following way: We know that exceeding a certain
global level of emissions leads to human rights infringements. Now we would like
to know under which conditions an individual state's level of emissions is to be
considered as actively contributing to dangerous climate change, i.e. as a human
rights violation rather than a failure to protect human rights. The solution to
this problem is to come up with a distributive principle that sets an emission
limit for each individual state, a limit above which the state is considered an
active contributor to dangerous climate change. Since what we are looking for is
a distributive principle, it is natural that the share each state is assigned should
be a fair share. If this is correct, then a state that exceeds its fair share of
emissions is actively contributing to dangerous climate change, while failing to
take up the slack does not count as an active contribution to dangerous climate
changetaking up the slack is a positive action taken to protect human rights
by preventing dangerous climate change from happening, or by making it less
severe than it would otherwise be.
Having identiﬁed the duty to take up the slack as a positive duty to protect
human rights, the second step of the argument would then be the claim that
there either are no positive duties to protect human rights of future people
at the global level, or else only in a weaker form, for example in the form of
humanitarian duties. If one is ready to accept this second step, then this seems
to provide grounds for the position that each state is morally required to remain
within its fair share of emission rights (as a consequence of the duty not to
violate human rights), but not to take up the slack of other states.
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More subtly, even someone who accepts a positive duty to protect the human
rights of future people might argue that there is a diﬀerence with regard to the
duty to take up the slack between a scenario in which a collection of agents
together share a positive duty to prevent an externally caused harm from occur-
ring, and a scenario in which some of the agents involved are actively causing
the harm that needs to be prevented rather than just failing to contribute to the
prevention eﬀorts.
Let's assume that, in both scenarios, some of the agents are non-compliers.
In the ﬁrst scenario, the non-compliers are failing to fulﬁl a positive duty by
refusing to do their part in rescuing people from harm they did not cause. In
the second scenario, not only are the non-compliers refusing to provide help, they
are also the ones who brought about the harm in the ﬁrst place. One could hold
that this makes a diﬀerence for the strength of the duty to take up the slack.
One way of putting it is that it is even more unfair if I have to prevent harm
that is being caused by another agent than if another agent is only not doing
his share of preventing harm that is caused externally. The greater unfairness
involved in stepping in for other agents who are causing harm rather than merely
failing to prevent harm could then tip the scales against the duty to take up the
slack.12
Still, it is diﬃcult for anyone who shares the view that there is a positive duty
to protect human rights at the global level to argue that preserving fairness in
the group of contributors has lexical priority over protecting these rights. One
cannot without tension acknowledge these rights and in the next instance claim
that fairness considerations always take priority over them, since the reasons
which lead to the claim that there are positive duties to protect human rights
remain present under conditions of partial compliance.13 The strong thesis that
doing more than one's fair share is never morally required in the context of
climate justice is therefore hard to reconcile with the position that there is a
positive duty to protect human rights with a global scope.
It should be noted that rejecting the strong thesis only leads to the weak
conclusion that the fairness objection does not rule out the duty to take up the
slack. For all that has been said here, it could still be the case that fairness
considerations limit the amount of morally required slack taking.
There might be a weaker, more plausible version of the fairness objection (see
Horton 2004). It thus remains open just how weighty the burden of the duty
to take up the slack isor in other words, how much below their fair share the
compliers must lower their emissions under partial compliance conditionsbut
rejecting the fairness objection in its strong form excludes the position that no
12 We thank an anonymous referee for bringing this point to our attention. See also Licht-
enberg 2010, 563.
13 Arneson 2004 and Cullity 2004, 75, both make a similar point with regard to the duty
of beneﬁcence (and in response to Murphy), using a rescue case as a clear example of a
situation in which an agent is morally required to do more than his fair share. Even though
it may be problematic to transport intuitions elicited by rescue cases to other contexts, for
reasons mentioned by Miller 2007, 234235, these examples still illustrate the crucial point
that the reasons for the existence of a positive duty do not disappear under partial compliance
conditions.
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extra burden at all can be justiﬁed. Admittedly, this leaves the problem unsolved
how to justify a non-arbitrary cut-oﬀ point for the duty to take up the slack.14
Solving this problem goes beyond the scope of this paper. But the fact that it is
not evident what the cut-oﬀ point should beat what point do considerations
of unfairness or demandingness outweigh the importance of protecting human
rights?should not stop us from acknowledging that a moderate amount of
unfairness certainly seems tolerable if the alternative is a massive infringement
of human rights. The fact that the cut-oﬀ point for a duty to take up the slack
cannot easily be identiﬁed does not entail that there is no non-arbitrary cut-oﬀ
point at all and neither does it entail that the only non-arbitrary cut-oﬀ comes
at the point of zero slack taking. In conclusion, granting that having to take up
the slack is unfair is compatible with the claim that there is a duty to take up
(at least part of) the slack.
4. The Eﬀectiveness Objection
We now turn to an objection of a very diﬀerent kind. In section 2 we said
that the basic argument for taking up the slack relies on the importance of the
human rights that are thereby protected. What we label the eﬀectiveness ob-
jection raises the question whether taking up the slack can actually be expected
to make any diﬀerence and, if it does, whether it can be expected to make a
positive diﬀerence. The ﬁrst worry is that reducing emissions in the midst of
non-compliers does nothing to mitigate climate change. The second and even
more pessimistic worry is that if we take social feedback eﬀects into account then
taking up the slack might even be counterproductive. If taking up the slack by
reducing emissions below one's fair share should make no positive diﬀerence as
far as the protection of human rights is concerned, then the case for taking up
the slack breaks down.15
Note that our focus lies on whether the emissions (or emission reductions) of
a single country can be said to make a diﬀerence with respect to climate change.
This is slightly diﬀerent from a focus on whether the emissions of a single country
can be said to causally contribute to, be responsible for or actively contribute to
climate change. In certain cases, these concepts do not coincide with the concept
of making a diﬀerence.16 These more diﬃcult concepts are relevant for various
14We thank Aaron Maltais and an anonymous referee for pressing us to clarify this point.
15 If one came to the conclusion that taking up the slack makes no diﬀerence then one might
also think that reducing one's emissions to one's fair share makes no diﬀerence. Note, however,
that for a number of non-consequentialist theories the failure of emission reductions to make a
diﬀerence would undermine the duty to take up the slack more decisively and straightforwardly
than the duty to stay within one's fair share.
16 Here are some examples. Failing to take up the slack can be said to make a diﬀerence
with respect to climate change but this does not imply that it counts as an active contribution
to climate change. In over-determination cases, one's action does not count as making a
diﬀerence to the outcome while it might possibly count as a cause of the outcome. Conversely,
the ﬂuttering of a butterﬂy's wings in a faraway country counts as making a diﬀerence with
respect to the weather here without it being obvious that it counts as a cause.
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issues but, luckily, for the speciﬁc issue of the eﬀectiveness objection it is the
more straightforward notion of making a diﬀerence that counts.17
The ﬁrst worry (unilateral emission reductions expectedly have no eﬀect on
the climate) is voiced in innumerable ways, especially for the more extreme
case of individual emission reductions. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2010, 337)
writes: [T]here is no individual person or animal who will be worse oﬀ if I drive
than if I do not drive my gas guzzler just for fun. Baylor Johnson (2011, 154)
says: [W]hether a particular person's emissions18 actually produces even a scin-
tilla of relief is far from obvious or the fate of the climate is unconnected to
whether that individual chooses to make unilateral reductions. Sandler (2010,
172) agrees: Even a person's entire lifetime impacts [. . . ] is likely to still be
inconsequential. Leist (2011, 30) talks a about a physically determined thresh-
old below which climate promoting behaviour is ineﬀective. In the loose talk
of blogs and newspaper columns similarly sweeping claims are made about the
eﬀect of emission reductions by whole countries, for example: [The American
Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009] would have no impact on climate change
without similar regulations by big polluters. (our emphasis)19 Since such rough
but radical statements are sometimes taken literally, it is important that their
proponents make clear whether they are to be taken as a shorthand for the
claim that many emission reductions expectedly have an extremely small eﬀect
or whether they actually are to be taken at face value as claims that many reduc-
tions have strictly no eﬀect. In the following we argue that sweeping statements
about unilateral reductions having strictly no climate change mediated eﬀect on
humans cannot be upheld.20
In one particular sense it is of course true that taking up the slack expect-
edly has no eﬀect. This is so if the only kind of eﬀect one is interested in should
consist in whether dangerous climate change will occur or not. However, there
is no reason why we should focus solely on whether dangerous climate change
will occur at all rather than also on how dangerous it will be if it occurs. It is
a peculiar feature of current public discourse that we sometimes speak as if the
morally salient issue is exclusively of a categorical nature: whether there will be
dangerous climate change or not, whether human rights will be violated or not,
whether there will be catastrophe or not. In contrast, the gradual issue often
receives too little attention: how dangerous climate change will be, how many
rights will be violated how severely, how catastrophic it will be. If the kind
of eﬀect we are interested in were only the 0/1-variable of whether dangerous
17 Sometimes it is suggested that there is also relevance to whether it is epistemically possible
to identify which particular individuals will be harmed in what particular way as a result of
our emissions (see for example the wording used by Sinnott-Armstrong (2010, 3367) or also
Jamieson (1992, 148)). We ﬁnd it diﬃcult to see the relevance of this, at least for the case
at hand. It does seem to us that behaviour of which we know that it violates rights or fails
to prevent avoidable harm is usually wrong independently of whether we have the epistemic
means of tracing the causal nexus precisely enough to know who exactly it is that is wronged.
18 Note that Baylor Johnson must be read as meaning emission reductions instead of emis-
sions.
19 http://www.ewross.com/Global_Governance.htm (retrieved June 21, 2011).
20 Note that the considerations we adduce would even support the stronger claim that in-
dividual emission reductions can be expected to make a diﬀerence.
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climate change will occur or not, then it would be true that in most cases our
emission reductions do not make a diﬀerence. In most cases, our slack taking
alone is not suﬃcient to prevent dangerous climate change from occurring. In
this categorical interpretation of the eﬀect, we are in a classical case of over-
determination (cf. for example Parﬁt 1984, 82). However, there is no reason
why we should not conceive of the morally relevant eﬀect in partial compliance
situations also in gradual termssurely, it matters how gravely dangerous cli-
mate change violates human rightsand if we do so, climate change ceases to
be an over-determination problem.
Even if one agrees, however, to conceive of the relevant eﬀect in gradual
terms, one might still be sceptical about slack taking making any diﬀerence to
how dangerous climate change will be. To this scepticism we now turn. Those
who doubt the eﬀectiveness of small unilateral emission reductions by single
countries do not usually doubt that a drastic cut to global emissions would make
a diﬀerence with respect to the severity of dangerous climate change. This
presents us with a puzzle: How could it be that a drastic cut to global emissions
does make a diﬀerence but that dividing a drastic cut up into innumerable small
cuts leaves these small cuts inconsequential? As Avram Hiller (2011, 354) put it:
If individual drives do not make any diﬀerence in [anthropogenic global climate
change], but everyone's driving does, then everyone's driving would have to be
some odd emergent entity which is not reducible to individual acts of driving.
But this is farfetched, metaphysically. Graphically speaking, if we concede that
lower global emissions imply a smaller human rights violating eﬀect than larger
global emissions, then we must also concede that the curve that connects point
A and B in the following ﬁgure must slope upwards at least in some places. And
that means that some increases in emissions must make a diﬀerence.
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Figure 1: The eﬀect of emissions.
We will distinguish four versions of how the curve that connects the two dots
might slope upwards. These four versions indicate how the eﬀect of additional
emissions by any given country depends on how much is emitted overall, or,
expressed conversely, how the eﬀect of additional emission reductions depends
on how much is reduced overall. (Of course, the claim that unilateral reductions
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make a diﬀerence is made given a certain level of emissions by other countries.21
This dependence on the behaviour of others is not a grave limitation on the
claim. There is not much behavior that makes a certain diﬀerence `in itself',
i.e. independently of the behaviour of others, at least if the description of the
behavior in question does not already include the diﬀerence that it makes). The
eﬀect on the vertical axis in the ﬁgures is to be interpreted as a function of
the number of persons whose human rights are violated and the severity with
which they are violated. Most of what we say would also apply if the eﬀect
were conceived of in terms of wellbeing losses, GDP losses, shortfall from a
suﬃciency threshold or any similar measure. In the following diagrams, if no
country exceeds its fair share, the level of global emissions remains below point
A. We assume the actual level of emissions to be higher than this, somewhere
between point A and B, and therefore suﬃcient for dangerous climate change.
The ﬁrst version of how the curve might slope upwards is the linear version. It
says that the eﬀect of a ton of emissions is positive and independent of how much
is emitted overall. If other countries exceed their fair share by a lot, additional
emissions on our part have the same eﬀect as if other countries exceeded their
fair share only by a little.
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Figure 2: The linear version.
The concave version says that the eﬀect is positive and increases less than pro-
portionally with increasing emissions. That is: If other states emit a lot more
than their share, additional emissions by our country cause less eﬀect than if
others emitted only a little more than their share. Or, expressed conversely: if
others do not reduce their emissions, reductions by our country have a smaller
beneﬁcial eﬀect than if others reduced their emissions, too.
The convex version says the opposite.22 It says that the eﬀect of emissions is
21 Taking the level of emissions of others as given is not meant to exclude that this given
level of others is itself inﬂuenced by our decision to reduce or increase our emissions.
22 Interesting questions can come up in the convex and concave version due to the fact that
the extent of the beneﬁcial eﬀect of any ton of emission reduction depends on the compliance
level of others. If someone were to claim, for example, that there is a duty to take up half of
the slack, she would have to specify whether there is a duty (i) to eﬀectuate half the beneﬁcial
eﬀect th t the compliance of the non-compliers would have had or (ii) to take ver half of the
tons that the non-compliers left over. In the convex and the concave version, (i) and (ii) do
not amount to the same.
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Figure 3: The concave version.
positive and increases more than proportionally. Any additional ton of emissions
causes a larger eﬀect than each ton before. This means: If due to non-compliance
the overall emissions level is higher than if every country limited itself to its fair
share, then any given ton of emissions will have a larger negative eﬀect than it
would have had otherwise. Conversely, any ton of emission reduction will have
a larger beneﬁcial eﬀect than if all remained within their fair shares.
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Figure 4: The convex version.
The fourth versionthe tipping point versionsays that all of the eﬀect is due
to a tipping point where the curve slopes vertically upwards. If the whole eﬀect
were due to such a tipping point (or due to a number of tipping points) then
the curve would necessarily have to be ﬂat at all other points. A ﬂat part of the
curve indicates that emission reductions make no diﬀerence.
In casual talk we often use wordings that, when taken literally, refer to this
version. We speak as if there were a certain threshold below which emissions
are inconsequential, at which dangerous climate change sets n a d above which
further emissions make no diﬀerence for the worse since dangerous climate change
has come into eﬀect anyway. This would mean that in the territory below and
above the critical level taking up the slack in the form of unilateral emission
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Figure 5: The tipping point version.
reductions would have no eﬀect. In this territory, the eﬀectiveness objection
would apply.
The tipping point version, however, seems too stylized to be true. It is
implausible that the eﬀects of our emissions should exhibit such radical kinks.
When people paint such a picture of the situation, they most likely try to express
in a rough and easy way the sense that we are in the convex version (and in
particular the sense that there are very convex parts of the curve, i.e. parts
where additional emissions quickly become much more consequential). It would
be cumbersome to verbally capture a more precise description and so they retreat
to a simpliﬁcation that corresponds, when taken literally, to strictly rectangular
kinks.
If the tipping point version is false, i.e. if the eﬀect cannot exclusively be
attributed to one or more points where the curve slopes vertically upwards, then
there must be some parts of the curve that are not ﬂat but rather slope upwards
but less than vertically so. And in these parts, emission reductionshowever
smalldo make a diﬀerence.
Conceding that the tipping point version is false only implies that emissions
make a diﬀerence at least in some areas. In principle, it might still be the case
that in other areas the curve is ﬂat and only starts to slope upwards (according to
the linear, the convex, or the concave version) after some threshold is reached.
What we would like to know, of course, is whether the curve is ﬂat at the
particular point where global emissions currently are and can be expected to be
in the future. Is the compliance level that we face in the real world such that
the curve slopes upwards, i.e. are we in an area where emissio reductionseven
small onesdo make a diﬀerence?
Even though this is diﬃcult to assess, we can note two points. The ﬁrst
is that economists typically estimate the social cost of carbon to be positive
(see Tol 2008). The social co t of carbon is a price t g on the damag done
by an additional ton of carbon dioxide. Making the plausible assumption that
a higher social cost of carbon is an indicator of higher climate chang related
human rights violations, we can conclude that we are in a situation where the
curve slopes upwards, i.e. where additional emissions have a negative eﬀect. This
speaks against the assumption that we are in territory where the curve is ﬂat. As
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the stock of carbon in the atmosphere rises, not only is total damage expected
to rise but, according to Robert Mendelsohn (2005, 138), marginal damage is
expected to rise as well. This indicates that we are in convex territory.
A second point to note is that even if we were to grant the claim that taking
up the slack in the form of unilateral emission reductions has an extremely small
eﬀect, the claim that the eﬀect is strictly zero is a stronger claim still. It is just
as arbitrary to assume that the curve is ﬂat in a particular area as it is to assume
that it points slightly upwards or downwards. There is nothing natural or salient
about a slope of exactly zero. It would be pure chance if the curve should happen
to be perfectly ﬂat in any given areaand therefore also in the area where we
currently ﬁnd ourselvesand thus, in the absence of a positive reason, we should
not assume that it is.
The upshot is that it is reasonable to assume that unilateral emission re-
ductions make a diﬀerence. This upshot must be qualiﬁed slightly: unilateral
emission reductions expectedly make a diﬀerence. The expected diﬀerence that
small emission reductions make is most likely composed of the following: First,
for any small emission reduction there is a large probability that it makes hardly
any positive diﬀerence; second, for any small emission reduction there is a small
probability that it makes a large positive diﬀerence; third, for any small emis-
sion reduction there is a small probability that it makes a negative diﬀerence.
For all we know, reducing emissions by one further megaton might just happen
to change the climate in such a way that one further storm is created rather
than prevented or it might also, for all we know, just happen to prevent a thou-
sand further storms. That is: in the small scale, the curves are not as smooth
as drawn in the above ﬁgures but rather resemble a staircase with many little
tipping points.23
However, this insight is of limited action-guiding signiﬁcance as we do not
know where all these little tipping points in the small scale lie. Therefore, we
do not know what the actual eﬀect of a speciﬁc small emission reduction is.
What we do know, however, is its expected eﬀect. And the expected eﬀect is
relevant (cf. Kagan 2011, 119120). We do not only have reason to prevent
a human rights violation of which we are certain but we also have reason to
prevent a ﬁfty percent chance of two human rights violations or a tiny chance
of incredibly many and large human rights violations.24 If there is a reason to
23 This is so at least if the curves represent actual eﬀects. If the curves already represented
expected eﬀects (assuming we do not know where the tipping points lie) then the smooth
curvature is appropriate.
24 Two remarks are appropriate. First, we do certainly not mean to imply a simpliﬁed ethics
of risk in which there is equal reason to prevent a certain rights violation as there is to prevent
a 50% chance of two rights violations of the same type. If anything, there is more reason to
prevent the latter. Second, note that the fact that the expected diﬀerence that our emission
reductions make can often be attributed to a small chance of making a large diﬀerence also
solves the problem of imperceptibly small eﬀects. Some might see positive diﬀerences that are
too small for anybody to be noticed as not counting as genuinely positive eﬀects. This is a
highly questionable position in the ﬁrst place, but even if it were plausible, the fact that we
are dealing mainly with small chances of largeand therefore: for many people perceptible
diﬀerences would circumvent this problem (on this issue, see Kagan 2011 and Parﬁt 1984,
chapter 3).
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prevent human rights violations then there is also a reason to prevent expected
human rights violations. And of such expected violations we know that they are
aﬀected by our emission reductions.
All of this is not to say that no psychological problem remains (cf. Gardiner
2011, 42; Unger 1996, 756). The diﬀerence that a small unilateral emission
reduction of a single country makes isor is at least believed to beso over-
whelmingly minuscule relative to the overall expected harm of climate change,
that the motivation to engage in such unilateral reductions can be completely
stiﬂed. This psychological problem can be mitigated somewhat, ﬁrst, if we refuse
to remain agnostic about the estimated order of magnitude of the eﬀect of small
reductions (the agnosticism on the surface all too often hides an implicit assump-
tion that it is negligibly small) and, second, if we compare the prevented human
rights violations not to the overall amount of expected human rights violations
but rather to the (comparably small) costs of prevention for ourselves. As far
as the ﬁrst pointventuring actual estimatesis concerned, John Nolt's (2011)
calculations are of help. He takes estimates of the total harm done by global
greenhouse gas emissions and assumes that harm is proportional to emissions.25
Nolt's admittedly crude ﬁgures let us conclude that 1840 metric tons of CO2
equivalenti.e. the lifetime emissions of the average Americancorrespond to
the suﬀering and/or death of one or two future people. This number yields a
basis for rough calculations of the order of magnitude of the diﬀerence that po-
litical measures to take up the slack would make. The number seems far from
negligible.
Up to now, we faded out from our view that emission reductions not only
make a diﬀerence by changing the physical state of the world but also by having
secondary eﬀects through changes in the behaviour of others. Taking this into
account can yield an eﬀectiveness objection in a second and more radical form:
Taking up the slack might have an eﬀect on the protection of human rights but a
negative one. This second objection is based on economic, political and psycho-
logical assessments about the social feedback eﬀects of our emission reductions.
Economists are known for pointing out such eﬀects: If we know that someone
else will get the job done if we shirk, there is an incentive for us to shirk. Thus,
while slack taking in itself can be expected to contribute to the mitigation of
climate change, this eﬀect might be outweighed by the indirect eﬀect of tempt-
ing others to increase their non-compliance. Reducing emissions below one's fair
share could thus ultimately lead to more human rights being violated. However,
it is an empirical question how strong this incentive is and the answer to this em-
pirical question is not obvious (cf. for example Fischbacher/Gächter et al. 2001).
25 Note that dividing the aggregate eﬀect by total emissions will underestimate the eﬀect in
case we are in the steeper part of a convex curve. The division might of course also overestimate
the eﬀect. Here are two potential reasons for this. First, part of the aggregate eﬀect might be
due to imperceptibly small eﬀects. Some might view such unnoticeable eﬀects as not counting
towards the overall eﬀect. Second, many of those whose life is made worse due to emissions
will not be made suﬃciently worse as to have their human rights violated. If we sum up small
worsenings for many well oﬀ persons whose human rights are not violated then the sum is not
as bad (if it counts as bad at all) as a worsening of the same magnitude that hits a single
person whose human rights are violated.
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The non-compliers might be more impressed by the leadership of the role models
than by the opportunity to free-ride in humanity's joint task of creating a safe
future. Also, the eﬀect of slack taking on the non-compliers can be inﬂuenced
by the slack takers: By taking up the slack secretly or by communicating wisely
with the non-compliers, they can partly control in what light their actions as
do-gooders are seen and therefore what eﬀect they have. For an illuminating
discussion, see Stemplowska's (2011) thoughts on a parallel objection by J. L.
Cohen (1981).
Besides such direct psychological eﬀects of taking up the slack (incentivizing
free-riding, creating shame on the non-compliers for belonging to the bad guys,
setting new paradigms of green lifestyle, etc.), there are innumerable further av-
enues through which taking up the slack aﬀects the compliance levels of others.26
If the slack takers use less fossil fuel, this decreases demand for fossil fuel and
therefore also its price. This in turn incentivizes the non-compliers to use more
fossil fuel. Alternatively, innovations in clean technology by the slack takers as
well as experimentation with various forms of political regulation can make it
cheaper for the non-compliers to reduce emissions (cf. also Maltais 2011). This
should lead them to increase their compliance levels.
A further avenue has to do with the method of ascribing emissions (cf. Pe-
ters/Hertwich 2008): If the slack takers judge themselves to have reduced their
emissions even if they only relocate their dirty industries to other countries
and then import the goods these industries produce, then, of course, nothing
is gained by slack taking. By becoming more independent of oil imports, slack
takers change global power relations, which in turn will have ramiﬁed eﬀects on
political choices made by the non-compliers. And so on. It is of course extremely
diﬃcult to make a guess on whether taking up the slack (i) increases the compli-
ance level of non-compliers, (ii) decreases the compliance level of non-compliers,
but not suﬃciently to outweigh the eﬀort of the slack takers or (iii) decreases the
compliance level to such an extent as to outweigh the eﬀort by the slack takers.
We must, however, submit that (iii) does not initially seem more plausible than
(i) or (ii). In addition, some clues in these otherwise fairly blind guesses might
be gleaned from the literature on the rebound eﬀect (cf. e.g. Greening/Greene
et al. 2000, 392) and carbon leakage (cf. e.g. Droege 2011, 1192) both of which
shed further doubt on the plausibility of (iii). In our view, it is proponents of
position (iii) that bear the burden of proof if they want social feedback eﬀects
to be taken as a serious strengthening of the eﬀectiveness objection.
Also, we should note that we are not forced to limit ourselves to global judge-
ments about the eﬀect of slack taking on compliance. Even if the eﬀectiveness
objection should be plausible in some cases or in an overall judgement about the
average eﬀect, we could still hold that there is a duty to take up the slack in
those cases where we know that there will be no bad consequences of taking up
26 In addition, it can even aﬀect our own compliance. If we reduce emissions drastically
today this can have secondary eﬀects by either facilitating our future emission reductions (for
example through the psychological momentum we created) or impeding our future emission
reductions (for example because we already exhausted the low hanging fruit of easy reduction
opportunities).
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the slack. The eﬀectiveness objection is not apt to show that agents are never
required to do more than their fair share, since there could always be at least
some circumstances in which the expected consequences of taking up the slack
are good.
However, our criticism of the eﬀectiveness objection goes even further. Up
to now we implicitly agreed with the claim that if taking up the slack in terms
of additional emission reductions would have no eﬀect or a negative eﬀect, then
there would be no reason to take up the slack. Until now, we argued that the
antecedent is false: We made the empirical claim that taking up the slack in
terms of additional emission reductions actually does make a positive diﬀerence
in terms of decreasing the amount and severity of human rights violations. Now,
we want to hint at the option of making a slight amendment to our position.
This amendment invalidates the above implication: Even if additional emission
reductions had no eﬀect or a negative eﬀect on the protection of human rights,
there would still be a case for taking up the slackas long as the slack is not
taken up in the form of additional emission reductions. The slight and plausible
amendment to our position is this: Up to now, we argued that if non-compliers
emit more than their fair share, compliers ought to engage in additional emission
reductions beyond their fair share. They should do so for the sake of protecting
human rights. We now amend our position by claiming that compliers ought
to bear additional burdensof whatever kindfor the sake of protecting hu-
man rights rather than necessarily engaging in additional emission reductions
for the sake of protecting human rights (cf. Cripps 2011; Murphy 2000, 120).
Natural candidates for bearing additional burdens in other forms than emission
reductions are, ﬁrst, supporting adaptation measures such that those aﬀected by
climate change can cope with it rather than suﬀer from human rights violations
due to unpreparedness and, second, making an eﬀort to convince non-compliers
of the urgency of emission reductions, facilitating international negotiations,
spreading information about the danger of climate change, and other forms of
promoting27 a political solution. Note that in contrast to the ﬁrst alternative
(adaptation) which takes partial compliance as given and only focuses on re-
sponding properly to it, the second alternative (promoting a political solution)
tackles compliance levels as the root of the problem, thereby not only protecting
human rights of future generations but also increasing fairness within the present
generation.
If taking up the slack in the form of additional emission reductions should
prove to have no beneﬁcial eﬀect, one could simply direct one's eﬀorts in one of
those other directions. Often, we are more conﬁdent about the beneﬁcial eﬀect
of these other directions and if this is the case, then taking up the slack in the
form of pouring eﬀort into these other directions is immune to the eﬀectiveness
objection. If it actually is legitimate to substitute a certain way of carrying
the burden of doing one's fair share under full compliance by a diﬀerent way of
carrying the burden under partial compliance then the eﬀectiveness objection is
even further undermined.
27 Shouldering burdens in the form of enforcing the duties of justice that the non-compliers
do not voluntarily accept is a special case that would merit separate treatment.
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Summing up, if we are either right with our empirical estimate (that taking
up the slack via emission reduction contributes to the protection of human rights)
or with our normative claim (that one can also take up the slack in the form
of other burdens, most notably in the form of support for adaptation measures
or in the form of shouldering the eﬀorts of promoting a political solution), then
the eﬀectiveness objection has no bite against the duty to take up the slack in
partial compliance conditions.
5. Conclusion
In this article, we asked whether there is a duty for those countries who limit
their greenhouse gas emissions to their fair share to reduce their emissions even
further if other countries emit excessively. We argued that the mere fact that fair
shares are fair shares and that they determine the extent of the responsibility
to reduce emissions under conditions of full compliance does not settle the issue
under partial compliance. Given that the non-compliance of the excessively
emitting countries puts human rights at risk and given that the protection of
human rights is a high moral priority, there is at least a pro tanto reason to take
up the slack.
We surveyed two countervailing arguments. The ﬁrst argument against the
duty to take up the slack was the fairness objection. We singled out its strongest
form, viz. that there is unfairness in having a duty to bear costs as a result of the
non-compliance of others. We granted that this is indeed unfair but that there
are no sound reasons why fairness among the duty-bearers should have lexical
priority before the protection of human rights of the victims of climate change.
The second argumentthe eﬀectiveness objectionis based on the doubt that
reducing emissions below one's fair share might have no positive eﬀect on the
protection of human rights. We argued that the empirical case against a positive
eﬀect is weak and that even if it were not, it would be plausible to allow slack
taking in forms of which one can be conﬁdent that their eﬀect on the protection
of human rights is positive.
Rejecting these two prominent objections, as we have done, strengthens the
position that the pro tanto reason is suﬃcient to ascribe a duty to the compliers
to protect the human rights of future generations by making eﬀorts beyond
reducing their emissions to their fair share. In the context of climate policy,
neither the fairness objection nor the eﬀectiveness objection decisively speaks
against the duty to take up the slack. This should not distract, of course, from
the fact that ﬁrst and foremost the non-compliers ought to step up to their duties
and thus prevent others from having to step in for them.
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